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ABSTRACT 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL ARMY SYSTEM: 
A DIAGNOSIS OF  PERCEPTIONS  
 
Işıkçı, Erol 
M.B.A., Department of  Management 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Kamil Kozan 
 
July 2002 
 
This study analyzes the perceptions about the concept of professional army. It 
aimed to find out the ideas and attitudes of the management people in defence sector 
toward being an army with totally professional soldiers. 
Recently, the effectiveness of the Army’s personnel was questioned for being 
totally professional, and efforts to modernize it or set up a completely new system. 
This large-scale organizational change has been discussed on the framework of open-
system theory. Although there may be various reasons for their perceptions, the 
reasons behind those perceptions are not investigated. 
The thesis will enable some information for further studies by picturing the 
present condition and finding the individual perceptions of respondents at all levels 
(upper, middle and lower levels) before the professional army established so that it 
gives a way for understanding how the social perception will change when the 
transformation is underway.  
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ÖZET 
 
PROFESYONEL ORDU SİSTEMİ HAKKINDA GÖRÜŞLERİN TESPİTİ 
 
Işıkçı, Erol 
Yüksek Lisans, İşletme Fakültesi  
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Kamil Kozan 
 
Temmuz, 2002 
 
Bu çalışma profesyonel ordu hakkındaki görüşleri analiz eder. Çalışmada 
Savunma Sanayiinde yönetici konumundaki kişilerin tam profesyonel bir orduya 
geçiş hakkındaki görüş ve tutumları ortaya çıkarılmaya çalışıldı. 
Son zamanlarda ordunun tamamen yeni bir sisteme geçmesi ve modernize 
edilmesi konuları tartışılırken, insan kaynakları sisteminin de etkinliği ve tamamen 
profesyonel personelden oluşması sorgulanmıştır. Bu büyük çaplı organizasyon 
değişikliği açık sistem yaklaşımı çerçevesinde ele alınmıştır. Tespit edilen tutum ve 
algılamaların nedenleri çeşitli olmakla birlikte sadece modelin bütünleyici yaklaşımı 
ile yetinilmiş ve bu algı farklılıklarının nedenleri araştırılmamıştır.  
Ancak çalışma şimdiki durumu tespit etmesi ve her kademedeki (üst-orta-alt) 
yöneticiye uygulanmış olması nedeniyle değişimin tamamlanması sonrasında 
yapılacak olan araştırmalarda algılamaların ne yönde değiştiğini anlamada yardımcı 
olacaktır. 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Profesyonel ordu, askeri sistemler, değişim, algı, dönüşüm 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Just a few years ago, the Berlin Wall was razed, symbolically announcing 
the end of the Cold War and declaring the dawn of a new era of great change. Unlike 
the relatively predictable environment of the Cold War, we are now faced with much 
uncertainty in a world of rapidly accelerating change. This new environment requires 
a different posture for every organization, including the army. As a result, an army is 
presently undergoing more substantive change than any period it has witnessed in its 
history.  
 In the light of these developments, the Turkish Army plans to transform its 
concept and doctrine, while building unit organizations that can adapt itself readily to 
changes, and changing the ways of training soldiers and leaders. For instance, a new 
tank replaces the old one, and a new howitzer replaces the old one. However, the 
transformation process in an army system is generally more comprehensive than the 
examples about the technological change given above. This kind of transformation 
will not only be limited to technology but it will largely affect human resource and 
the way that they do their job.  
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 The fundamental key to controlling and integrating change effectively in 
the Turkish Army is to raise the level of knowledge and awareness. In the process of 
this transformation, firstly a conceptual notion of what must be done to change 
successfully in the environments of today and tomorrow should be defined. Such a 
conceptual notion can only stem from a close, detailed and reflective study of the 
Army and its environment. Related to this, open system approach enables us to 
realize our aim by giving a framework to analyze the system with its input, output, 
system and the environmental factors as explained below: 
  Time, money, human, machines and vehicles can be examples of INPUT. 
Time is needed in implementing a major change in the organization's culture. Money, 
or in another name funding, is essential for developing and acquiring future combat 
systems and modernizing aging equipment. However, this study focused on human 
dimension since it is the most precious asset of every organization. 
 For military institutions the most important OUTPUT is the success on the 
battle. The Army must always be ready to deploy immediately, to fight and to sustain 
its operations, even though it is continually evolving. Because of that reason, this is 
one of the focuses of our study.  
 Army can be defined as a large-scale, complex, interdisciplinary 
organization operating in an open-systems environment. In today’s environment, 
Specialized Sergeant System and Contracted Officer System can be defined as the 
last drives toward professional army SYSTEM. 
 Economic pressures, new opportunities, technological imperatives, legal 
constraints, cultural pressures are the examples of ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS. 
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Amongst external environmental factors, economical considerations are the 
fundamental ones to be studied. However, cultural considerations and the 
characteristics and values of the institution itself determine the relative success of 
military change. So, the cultural considerations have been investigated due to their 
importance in internal environment. 
In order to investigate the ideas about the areas described above, a survey 
has been constructed on the key components (i.e. input, output, system, 
environmental factors and the feedback) of an open-system model. The participants 
were chosen from the managers of institutions that operate in defense sector who are 
knowledgeable about the research topic. 
The specific research questions are: 
1. What are the perceptions of participants concerning Professional Army 
System from the standpoint of open-system approach? 
2. Are there any disparities in perceptions related to Professional Army 
considerations between upper-level, mid-level, and lower-level managers? 
3. On which factors do their perceptions differ about Professional Army System 
concerning economy, culture, battle efficiency, human resource provision, 
and present systems? 
It is important to note that the current study is not limited to these questions. 
All other interesting findings are welcomed. Hence, the research questions will not 
be hypothesized. 
            The words “draft” and “conscription”, “all-volunteer force (AVF)”, and 
“totally professional army” have used interchangeably in some parts of the study. 
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In the following chapter, a review of the relevant literature is given. Next, the 
methodology used in the study is explained in detail. Following this, the empirical 
results are displayed and significant findings are discussed. Finally, the study is 
concluded with conclusion, implications, limitations of the study and further study 
areas. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Open System Approach 
A biologist, Otto Von Bertanfly is credited with stating the theoretical 
foundations of system theory. He constructed a model according to his theoretical 
framework and basically this model has five components: (1) inputs (materials, 
human resources, time, money etc.), (2) system itself (in our study, army), (3) 
outputs (products, services or success), (4) feedback mechanism (production reports, 
evaluation forms, appraisals and incentives),  (5) the environment in which the 
system operates (in open-systems system effects the environment and gets effected 
by the environment).  
This study is consistent with the model explained above and interested in all 
components by sampling at least one factor for each component. For example, 
provision of human resources was investigated as an example of input component, 
battle efficiency was investigated as an example of output component, economical 
and cultural considerations were investigated as the examples of external and internal 
environmental factors, and the present system with the Specialized Sergeant and 
Contracted Officer sub-systems were investigated as the example of system 
component. The only exception was the feedback, but instead of that, future system 
expectations were investigated.  
  The system theory approach is intended to be prescriptive rather than 
explanatory. So the main purpose of this study is to explore perceptions of 
participants about the concept of professional army.  
 
 
 
 
 
        Figure 1. ARMY as an open-system organization 
 
2.2. Military Systems 
 In order to make it clear, we can define military systems and their 
differences between each other by grouping them into three: 
1. Compulsory service-based system: Only some of the military personnel 
(Officers, non-commissioned officers, civilian officials and workers) are 
paid for their services and every citizen (may not be valid for women) has 
to be in military service for a period of time at some ages. Three sub-groups 
can be defined: 
a. National Service: All men are required to serve in the military or in 
government job for a certain time according to age cohorts. 
INPUTS 
 
ARMY 
 
OUTPUTS
feedback 
environment 
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b. Selected Service: The enlistees are chosen within an eligible pool by 
a lottery method. The selected service is the result of the draft system 
as the entire eligible pool exceeds accession requirements. 
c. Monetary Service and Conscription: In this system, people who can 
afford to pay a certain amount of money, can avoid conscription. The 
money limit can be adjusted to enable the military to meet its 
manpower requirements.  
2. Professional System: Military system in which all-military personnel are 
paid and none of the citizens are responsible for obligatory service. 
3. Semi-professional System: Combination of 1and 2. The rate of paid 
personnel is much more greater then the rate of personnel in service 
obligatory. Generally it is seen in countries, which targeted professional 
system but could have not materialized yet.  
 
   2.3. Military System In Turkey  
 The military system in Turkey can be called as compulsory service-based 
system. The properties of the system are summarized in the following paragraphs 
about the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF)1.  
 The Chief of General Staff is appointed by the President as Commander of 
the Armed Forces and is responsible to Prime Minister. The Council of Ministers is 
responsible to Turkish Grand National Assembly for national security and the 
preparation of the Armed Forces to defend the country. However, authority to 
                                                 
1 The information given and  further information can be found in their web site of 
TAF: <http://www.tsk.mil.tr> 
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declare a state of war and send Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries or allow 
foreign armed forces to be stationed in Turkey rests with Turkish Grand National 
Assembly. 
The Chief of the Turkish General Staff is responsible to the Prime Minister 
and is charged with the overall command and control of the Turkish Armed Forces. 
He is also responsible for: 
        1. Conducting the military operations effectively 
        2. The operational readiness of Turkish Armed Forces 
     Figure2.3. Organization Chart Of Turkish Army 
 
The commanders of the three services (Land, Naval, and Air) report directly 
to the Chief of the Turkish General Staff. Turkish General Staff and the Ministry of 
National Defense work in close coordination and cooperation to fulfill their 
respective responsibilities. The General Command of Gendarmerie and the Coast 
Guard Command, as a part of the internal security forces, are affiliated with the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs at peacetime; whereas at war-time, they fall under Land 
Forces Command and Naval Forces Command, respectively.  
PRIME MINISTER 
TURKISH GENERAL STAFF MINISTER  OF DEFENSE  coordination 
ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE 
GENDARMARIE COAST GUARD 
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The Turkish Armed forces missions and responsibilities are clearly stated in 
the Turkish Constitution and determined by laws as to react against new security 
challenges and crises in 2000’s, to be ready to face the uncertainties, and to ensure 
the security of Turkey against internal and external risks. In this context; the small but 
flexible units, having sufficient capability, equipped with technological weapon and 
systems, comprising sufficient command-control assets, precise and developed 
ammunition, covering early warning assets and also able to conduct operation in any 
weather condition are very desirable and take priority in the new approach.   
      The need for personnel in the Turkish Armed Forces is met through five 
sources:  
1. Officers :  
a. The Military Academy  
b. The N.C.O.s who are promoted to the rank of officer.  
c. The officers who have been graduated from a faculty or college.  
 
2. Non-Commissioned Officers  
a. Non-Commissioned Officer Preparation Schools 
b. The civilians who have been graduated at least from a High School or an 
equivalent of this institution.  
c. The specialized sergeants.  
 
3. Specialized Sergeants :  
a. Specialized Sergeant Training and Preparation Schools 
b. Sergeants and privates who have completed their compulsory military 
services.  
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4.   Enlisted Men: 
Every Turk who is at the age of 20 is responsible to perform his military 
service for 18 months as private, corporal or sergeant. If he is graduated from a 
faculty than he may become Third Lieutenant during military service for 18 
months or recruited as enlisted men for 8 months. 
 
5.  Civil Servants :  
They are selected from the ones who have been successful at the examination 
of Civil Servants held by the State’s Personnel Department and supervised by the 
OSYM. (The Center for Selecting and Placing the Students).  
In summary, 
• Officers make up the core command structure. 
•  The NCOs stand as the intermediate command level between officers and 
the enlisted.  
• The specialists are professional enlisted leaders. This new category of 
personnel is the result of Turkish Armed Forces’ professionalization drive.  
Last year, the Grand National Assembly legislated the contract officer law, 
which will allow the services to induct officers and NCOs for term contracts. Their 
initial contract will be 3 years that is the time–in-grade for a second lieutenant, or an 
NCO sergeant. Subsequent contracts shall be as long as the time-in-grade of the 
subsequent rank. They may serve up to 21 years in the armed forces.      
Compulsory military service is embedded in the Constitution of Turkish 
Republic. Every male citizen “has a right and duty to serve in the military” by our 
constitution, though it does not specify conscription, draft or any other method. The 
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constitution leaves the description of the “manner how this service is rendered” to the 
subordinate laws. Service category and duration determined according to the 
person’s educational attainment: About 30% of the university graduates (4- year or 
more faculty) who are selected by the services for skills (in terms of professions) 
needed by the TAF serve 16 months as reserve officers, whereas the rest serve 8 
months as short-term conscripts. Those who have less than 4-year university 
education have to serve 18 months service with a 3-month basic and branch training. 
Then they are distributed to the troops. 
The personnel mobilization system is also largely based on conscription. 
Recently released conscripts are assigned to the military units in their locality to be 
called up at mobilization. Most of these personnel do not undergo any refresher 
training with the implicit assumption that since they are released in the past three 
years, they will not need any extra training. Thus when they join the military units 
these units will be ready for combat even on the first day of mobilization. 
2.4. Military Systems In other Countries 
USA 
USA Land Forces has started transforming itself into a professional system in 
1973 according to law amended by American Congress and now USA Army has 
become a totally professional system. In that system, while all privates, enlisted men 
and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) are contracted, Officers work for 5 years 
compulsory and after than the President approves them so that they can work for the 
army as long as they can move along the hierarchical structure. 
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After the end of the Cold World War, due to the decision about reduction in 
the army personnel, some of the units were abolished. So 1.300.000 total number of 
the Army personnel declined to 550.000 after the transformation. 
Legally president has the authority to ask citizens for compulsory service in 
extraordinary cases. In Land Forces, women can work in all branches except combat 
arms in front-line; namely infantry, armored forces or ranger. 
They have reserve forces to activate incase of any national need. These forces 
are trained for some short periods yearly, and other times they make their own 
business. 
FRANCE 
Until 1996, the compulsory service-based system had been used, after that 
year transition begun and planned to be completed in year 2002. Now semi-
professional system is running, as half compulsory and half professional system. 
Now according to 2002 numbers: 
Officers                                         :16.000 (with average 30 years tenure) 
Non-commissioned Officers                            : 50.000 (with average 15 years tenure) 
Contracted Enlisted Specialists and Privates   : 64.000 (with average 8 years tenure) 
Voluntary Enlisted Specialists and Privates     : 5.000 (with average 2 years tenure) 
Civilian personnel       : 34.000 
TOTAL                                                              : 170.000 
They targeted to have 10% Officers, 40% NCOs, 50% contracted Enlisted 
Specialists and Privates. It is also possible to be contracted for officers and NCOs. 
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NCOs are the core part of the system since they are the biggest portions of the total 
personnel. %50 of Land Forces comprised from NCOs and 50% of them are 
promoted from contracted enlisted specialists and privates. 45% of the NCOs are also 
promoted to be officers. All the NCOs begin as contracted. After the NCO Sergeant 
Rank, they become commissioned. 11% of them are women. 
Although there was high rate of decrease in the number of the personnel, the 
budget was not reduced because more funds were expended for the education of 
personnel to keep up with the need for the qualified personnel and remaining part has 
been expended for the ones who choose to resign during that transformation process, 
they were prepared for the civilian life.  It is still possible for every French Citizen 
who say “I want to serve for the military voluntarily” to be in military service for 10 
months. 
 GERMANY 
The military system of Germany can be described as the combination of 
professional and compulsory systems. 
Now according to 2002 numbers: 
Officers                                          :20.500 (with average 30 years tenure) 
Non-commissioned Officers                            : 64.000 (with average 15 years tenure) 
Contracted Enlisted Specialists and Privates   : 131.000 (with average 8 years tenure) 
TOTAL                                                             : 220.000 
They targeted to have 9% Officers, 33% NCOs, 58% contracted Enlisted 
Specialists and Privates. 
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Every citizen, who has reached the age of 18, has to be armed for 10 months. 
This compulsory service has been shortened to 9 months at 2000 but there is still an 
option for the ones who want to stay in army to serve 23 months. It is also possible to 
serve in public sector up to four years instead of military for the ones who don’t want 
to be called to arms. 
Women personnel can only serve as privates, enlisted or in health services. In 
the near future female officers are planned to be employed but not in combat arms.  
Yearly, Germany has 400.000 human resources to recruit and only 100.000 
are recruited. To use all the available human resources they are planning of 
shortening periods to 6 months, which will help to transform the Army into totally 
professional system. 
 ISRAEL 
For men and women, it is compulsory to serve for Israel Defense Forces 
(Armed Forces). In the last year of high school, women are recruited for 19 months 
and men are recruited for 36 months. These men and women are given a survey in 
psychology and are introduced about military systems.  
Today, there have 45% Officers, 49% NCOs, 6% Civilian Personnel and 
women are not charged in combat arms. 
According to law, serving in military between the ages of 18 and 21 is 
compulsory for men and women. Besides, they are kept as reserved forces until the 
age of 54 for men and 24 for women. Refreshing training periods for men between 
the ages of 22 and 48 is 35 days, and 12 days between the ages of 49-54. Refreshing 
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training periods for women is 29 days until the age of 23. The ones who are asked to 
participate these trainings are informed at least 1 week before, and the government 
pays for their losses and accepts these personnel as on leave. 
KOREA 
They use compulsory service-based system. They have totally 560.000 
military personnel as 10% Officers (53.000), 33% Contracted Officers (3700), 
10%NCOs (48.000) and 77% Enlisted Specialists and Privates. 
Officers are the graduates of the Army Academy, University and the ones that 
are promoted from NCOs. Compulsory service is 5 years for officers and after that 
period the ones who chose to stay in the army may serve 5 more years. After the 
second 5 years the ones who don’t resign are appointed in critical duties. Most of the 
officers are graduates of faculties rather than Army Academy. NCOs are qualified 
enlisted specialists chosen by Battalion commanders and have educated in NCO 
schools for 1 year. 
Privates and Enlisted men are recruited for 26 months including university 
graduates.  The ones who are voluntary for Navy or Air forces have to enter an exam. 
The ones who selected Navy serve for 28 months and for Air forces serve 30 months. 
If the family has only one son, then he may be charged in factories, securities at 
metro and police departments nearby his home. There are some studies about 
specialized sergeant recruitments. 
In case of any extraordinary condition, they need for 2 million people and 
these reserved forces are trained periodically.  
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PAKISTAN 
They use professional system so military personnel are paid and chosen 
voluntarily, for example private gets about $50. They have 9 Army Corps and 
comprised of  
Land Forces    :480.000 
Navy               : 15.000 
Air Forces       :25.000 
TOTAL           :520.000 and only 26.000  (5%) are officers. 
However, laws let the government to call for compulsory service incase of 
any need. After the training periods from 16 to 66 weeks, they can be contracted for 
the periods of 4, 8 or 15 years. A private may be promoted to enlisted specialist or 
NCO and there is no other school to train NCOs. Officers may only be the graduates 
of the Army Academy, Technical or Medical University. Women are recruited as 
teachers or doctors. 
In any case of need, they use color codes to have reserve forces together in 72 
hours and every resigned officers are trained once in every two-year. 
ENGLAND 
It has professional and voluntary based system. Every soldier is paid in the 
military and contracted for the period of minimum 3.5 years to maximum 9 years. 
After the end of contraction period, personnel can leave or can go on if he/she has 
been successful enough and has good records. Normally, they can be recruited 
maximum 22 years until the age of 55. The minimum age for application is 17.5 and 
after 18 they can decide to stay or to leave.  
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If we look over the historical records, we can say that the British were 
convinced that a large conscript army could be a big threat to their freedoms and 
security. British Society took into account the geographical position of its country 
and claimed that the most important branch to keep was Navy. But later some 
situations as World War I and II forced the British Government to introduce 
Compulsory service in May 1939. After the World War II, Great Britain retained the 
conscript army until 1962. 
JAPANESE 
It has professional and voluntary based system. Every Japanese citizen, who 
has graduated from secondary school, and who is not older than 25 can be contracted 
to be soldier. Periods for contractions are three years and there is a 3 months training 
period at the beginning. The successful ones can be promoted to be officers.  
Shortly, types of military systems of some countries can be summarized by 
the information given below in Table 1: 
Country Populations  
(millions) 
Total Force System 
USA 276 2577300 AVF 
Britain 59 515300 AVF 
Netherlands 16 84140 AVF 
Japan 127 285900 AVF 
Canada 29 12400 AVF 
France 59 713430 Draft 
Turkey 66 988400 Draft 
Germany 82 685300 Draft 
Greece 11 450170 Draft 
Spain 39 613950 Draft 
Portugal 10 255580 Draft 
Norway 4 248700 Draft 
Table 1. The military systems of some countries                                                          
Source: The Military Balance 2000/2001 (London: Oxford University Press, 
2000) 
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2.5. ONGOING TRENDS ON MILITARY SYSTEM: AVF, CONSCRIPT OR 
MIX? 
Military conscription has been a controversial institution throughout history. 
For decades, it has been accepted that the armed forces divided into two mutually 
exclusive models: Conscription armies like those of France or Germany or non-
conscription armies, like Britain or USA. In the European context, only ten years 
ago, in 1992, Belgium decided to end its conscription system and some other 
countries have quickly followed: Netherlands in 1993, Spain 1995 and France in 
1996.  
So, what are the reasons underlying such a radical change? 
Mainly of all the basic reason underlying that fact is the accelerating speed of 
the change and the new environment it brings with. Kisses (2002) states this 
condition as following, “It is clear that the fall of the Berlin wall and everything that 
followed paved the ground for this change in the European armed forces. A first 
logical payoff seemed to be a reduction in size and budget, a common feature of 
today's reform of the armed forces.”  Burk (1992) defines today’s environment as 
“The enormous economic productivity and the high living standards in industrialized 
modern societies are based on a continuously increasing degree of functional division 
of labor and professional specialization.” And after than he concludes that “The 
driving forces of this process are technological progress and market penetration into 
all spheres of life and society, which imply an increasing degree of individualization 
and normative pluralization as well as the decreasing importance of traditional values 
and an erosion of the norm of compulsory military service.” 
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Haltiner (1998, p. 8) states, “This means that the armed forces of modern 
societies become leaner in personnel size. They rely on advanced technology and are 
highly differentiated and complex in their organization and function. Before long, 
they will first be partly, and then eventually, fully professionalized.” 
 According to Van Doorn, particularly the “large and rich countries” can 
afford to maintain forces on the basis of volunteers. He states that in societies with 
economic growth and increasing living standards will decrease, whereas the 
volunteer format of the military personnel will increase. In other words, there is a 
negative correlation between the socioeconomic degree of modernization and the 
extent of compulsion in recruiting personnel for the armed forces.  
But very few researchers have tested the concept empirically. Among these, 
the one by Kelleher stands out. After her study in 1978, “Mass Armies in the 1970s: 
The Debate in Western Europe,” which concentrated on six Western European states, 
she established that, given technical trends and the ongoing citizenship revolution, 
mass armies were declining. Assuming no major East-West conflict, no rapid 
progress toward European integration, and no extended period of economic warfare, 
it furthermore projected for the period from 1990 to 2000 that Western European 
armies would: 
• Be smaller in size (perhaps by as much as 30 percent); 
• Involve far fewer conscripts (if any, but no more than 25-30 percent) in 
primary military positions; 
• Involve far more specialists and technicians in more highly differentiated. 
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A study by Karl W. Haltiner (1998, p. 32) also supported that decline of mass 
armies theory. In his study, Haltiner tried to picture the present conditions for 15 
NATO countries, including Turkey, concluded that: 
• In the past twenty-five years, the armed forces of all Western European 
nations have become smaller in size, leaner in personnel, and technically and 
structurally much more differentiated. 
• The Western European military organizations base their recruitment to an 
increasing extent on voluntary personnel, regardless of whether conscription 
still exists in their countries or not. As a general tendency, the degree of 
compulsion for recruiting military personnel had decreased remarkably.  
            Haltiner pictures the condition in 15 Western NATO countries as depicted in 
Figure 3. 
If we turn back to the Turkish case, it is possible to say that throughout the 
history, the Turkish Military Service had been most of time a mixed system with a 
minority of professionals and a majority of non-professionals. It still is a mixed 
system, again with a larger core of professionals and a main body of conscripts. 
Today the four services of the TAF have varying levels of 
professionalization. None of the services is an “All Volunteer Force” or full 
professional military. Table 2 shows the levels of professionalization across services 
(Bıcaksız and Varoglu, 2002). 
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Figure 3. Typology of Force Structures                                                 Source:Armed Forces Society fall 1998, Page 18 
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Service Professionals* 
% of total service 
Conscripts** 
% of total service 
Army 16.7 83.3 
Navy 47.5 52.5 
Air Force 54.4 45.6 
Gendarmerie 17.7 82.3 
* Professionals include, commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers, 
specialists, and civilians (officials and workers). 
** Non-professionals include conscripted reserve officers, and  conscripts 
(subject to 18 or 8 months of service) 
Table 2.  Percentage of professionals in Army, Navy, Air Forces and 
Gendarmerie  
 
2. 6. DEBATES ON: AVF, DRAFT OR MIX? 
According to Maulen and Manigart (1997) “The decline of the mass army is a 
central fact in military sociology. Technological change and socio-cultural evolution 
are the major variables in bringing about this fundamental change in the recruitment 
and organization of manpower. Just as in other sectors of society (industry, 
agriculture) mass is replaced by machine.” 
Social scientists who make use of research findings to explain the limitations 
and strains found in the contemporary all-volunteer military tend to agree on one 
central conclusion. In general, they accept the premise that adequate economic 
incentives are of crucial importance. However, Janowitz (2002) points out the fact 
that economic incentives are an insufficient basis for adapting the all-volunteer 
military. Although this is the perspective of a variety of historians, psychologists, 
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political scientists, and sociologists, only the economists remain unmoved in their 
persistent conviction that higher pay incentives will solve the recruitment, retention, 
and performance dilemmas of the military services.  
So it is possible to say that recruitment and retention dilemma can be 
considered as the main concern in constituting and keeping the AVF. Gencer (2002, 
p. 2) states, “While the military’s requirement for highly educated personnel has 
increased in direct proportion to the increase in war-fighting technology, the number 
of college-educated recruits has diminished. Consequently, recruiting young men and 
women has become harder than ever before”.  
Advocates of all-volunteer system generally state that what distinguishes 
volunteers from others today is partly economics but also cultural attitudes. Young 
men and women who sign up are likely to be more pro-military, more authority-
minded and more traditional in social attitudes. Shortly they point out the fact that 
the all-volunteer force is made up of ''people who want to be there'' since it is 
essential to have motivated people, capable of intensive training, who can work well 
together in the army. There are also arguments against conscription in peacetime, 
especially given the diminishing long-term manpower needs of the armed services. 
Weisberg (1991, p. 17) states “Nations have military forces not to distribute burdens 
equally in society but to win wars. The military has its own rationale for opposing a 
draft: Volunteers suffer fewer morale and discipline problems than those pressed into 
service involuntarily.”  
On the other hand, critics claim that governments having AVF avoids 
collecting statistics that demonstrate disproportional class representation in the 
fighting ranks of the military.  For example, the percentage of soldiers who are the 
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children of lawyers or etc. Barone and Gergen, states (1990, p. 46) “Especially in 
American case there are some arguments about whether blacks are over presented. 
Critics of the volunteer force worry that blacks constitute roughly 25 percent, while 
they account for just 12 percent of the population. Others charge, for example, that 
blacks suffered an unfair number of deaths in Vietnam.”  
Kurt (2001, p. 44) groups the objections into five main categories: 
1. The mobilization and problem of reserved forces  
2. The cost of an AVF 
3. The social representation problem 
4. AVF decreases patriotism 
5. Erosion of civilian respect and isolation of the military 
 Above all, Kisses (2002) states that the success of the reform of non-
conscription armed forces is not a simple matter of technical decision-making. 
Sorensen (2000, p. 331) points out “The fate of conscription will thus be influenced 
by the public as much as by the political and military systems.” Or Smith (2002) 
states “…debate centering on the casualty factor will continue. Phrases such as 
“Another Vietnam or Somalia” will be bandied about…” 
 Moreover, national circumstances must be taken into consideration, such as 
the relationship between manpower needs and demographics and the value laid upon 
the embodiment of citizenship as well as cultural variables. Maulen and Manigart 
(1997) conclude, “The gap between demand and supply became too big, the 
ideological justification sounded too weak. The draft as an ideology appeared worn 
out the moment the draft as a system was no longer suitable.”  
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Finally, the geographical position is another factor to be taken into 
consideration. Cohen, in his study of Citizen and Soldiers (1985) states that 
“…perhaps the best predictor of a country’s system of military service are the length 
of its land borders with potentially hostile neighbors and size of its population 
relative to that of neighbors…” (p. 25). 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY  
“Open-System approach” was used to define the factors that effect the 
transformation into totally professional system. By using this framework, one or two 
factors were investigated for each component:  
1. “Draft System, Specialized Sergeant System, and Contracted Officer System 
Considerations “ were investigated in the SYSTEM component. 
2.  “Economical and Cultural considerations” were investigated in the 
ENVIRONMENTAL  FACTORS component. 
3. “Provision of Human Resources” was investigated in the INPUT Component. 
4. “Battle efficiency” was investigated in the OUTPUT Component. 
        Also the 5th one tries to capture EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE SYSTEM. 
 “Although voting preference polls and surveys of general social attitudes 
receive most of media attention, surveys have long been used in Army, in the years 
of World War II.”  (Edwards, 1996, p. 2). In the survey, 37 questions were 
constructed with regard to factors presented above, to get perceptions of managers in 
defense sector about the transformation process to professional army system. The 
respondents were asked to elicit their evaluations and perceptions about the 
sentences. 
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3.2. SAMPLE  
 Since the focus of the study was on perceptions of the management people, 
the data were collected by cluster sampling of the managers of eight institutions, 
operating in defense sector in Ankara territory. This cluster sampling enabled us to 
reach more representative of population. In our sample due to the high turnover rate 
of personnel appointment, it is like microcosms of population. 
After administering the 538 questionnaires to the managers, 489 of them  
answered the questionnaire. 41 participants are upper-level managers; 118 are mid-
level and 330 are lower-level managers who are working in Ankara territory. All 
respondents answered the questionnaire totally.   
 3.3. MEASURES 
             Respondents’ perceptions were measured by asking them to specify the 
extent to which they perceive the sentence on a scale with five choices from 
“strongly agree” to “disagree”. The respondents were also asked about their 
hierarchical level considering the effects of their total work life. The data are 
interpreted by using SPSS 10.0 Program.  
The reliability of the questionnaire has been checked by SPSS (version 10.0) 
program and Cronbach’s alphas for each component were estimated, these Alpha 
values were given in the following chapter. 
In the analysis, mean responses are calculated for each question in the 
questionnaire. The mean is simply the sum of the individual responses (1= “I don’t 
agree with the idea” to   9 = “I totally agree with the idea”) so the average score of 
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6,0 or more should be interpreted as agreement with the idea expressed and an 
average score of 4,0 or less should be interpreted as disagreement with the idea 
expressed. Scores between 4,0 and 6,0 show that respondents don’t have any 
consensus about the item in questionnaire or their indecisiveness.  
The questionnaire form was presented in Appendix A. 
In order to figure out the differences between 3 sub-groups of upper-level, 
mid-level, and lower-level managers, Anova table and post-hoc analysis were 
presented in Appendix B.  
Correlations between components were presented in Appendix C. These 
correlations are not investigated as they only present significant linear relationship 
but not any cause-effect relation. 
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RESULTS and FINDINGS 
4.1. SYSTEM COMPONENT: 
       In this section, the following points were discussed; 
 (1) What managers think about draft system with regard to performance, motivation, 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
 (2) Whether there is a need to transform into professional system. 
 (3) What managers think about the present practice of Specialized Sergeant System.   
 (4) What managers expect about the recently accepted Contracted Officer System. 
 
a. Draft System Considerations 
In order to capture the perceptions about Draft System, points (1) and 
(2) above, 5 questions were combined into composite index. The alpha value 
for this index is 0,6090, which is acceptable. According to our scale, the 
higher the estimated score the higher the respondent is in favor of 
professional army system.  
The histogram for the composite index of draft system considerations 
is presented below: 
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Figure 4. Histogram For Composite Index Of Draft System Considerations 
 
Related component items, detailed statistics and the comments about them 
were presented below:      
 
Component items 
  
Frequency
Percent  
(% of 
total) 
 
   
Mean* 
Std. 
Deviati
on 
 
 
1. Draft personnel are self-motivated 
enough to be trained and to accomplish 
their duties. 
1,00 
3,00 
5,00 
7,00 
9,00 
 
139 
193 
35 
86 
36 
489 
 
28,4 
39,5 
7,2 
17,6 
7,4 
 
 
 
3,7198 
 
 
2,5263 
 
 
2. Periodical change in draftees has a 
bad effect on performance. 
1,00 
3,00 
5,00 
7,00 
9,00 
 
8 
26 
30 
156 
269 
489 
 
1,6 
5,3 
6,1 
31,9 
55,0 
 
 
7,6667 
 
 
1,8569 
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3. Use of vehicles, materials and 
weapons by draftees decreases 
efficiency. 
 
1,00 
3,00 
5,00 
7,00 
9,00 
 
13 
44 
39 
143 
250 
489 
 
2,7 
9,0 
8,0 
29,2 
51,1 
 
 
7,3436 
 
 
2,1569 
 
 
4. Draft system negatively affects the 
degree of army’s readiness for a war. 
 
1,00 
3,00 
5,00 
7,00 
9,00 
 
26 
86 
63 
164 
150 
489 
 
5,3 
17,6 
12,9 
33,5 
30,7 
 
 
6,3333 
 
 
2,4573 
 
5. The problems faced nowadays can be 
solved in draft system without 
considering revising the system to totally 
professional. 
1,00 
3,00 
5,00 
7,00 
9,00 
 
225 
158 
35 
49 
22 
489 
46,0 
32,3 
7,2 
10,0 
4,5 
 
 
 
2,8937 
 
 
2,3129 
*Scale is 1 to 9 and 9 = “strongly agree”   
 
Our expectation was that, if respondents have some negative ideas 
about the motivation, performance, efficiency and effectiveness of draft 
system than they may think that the draft system should be revised or 
abolished. As it can be seen from the means and percentages, respondents 
generally are not in favor of present draft system and believe that, 
• Conscripts have not enough motivation to accomplish their training. 
(Related item number 1) 
• Periodical change has bad affects on performance. (Related item 
number 2) 
• Use of vehicles, materials and weapons by draftees decreases 
efficiency. (Related item number 3) 
• Readiness for a possible war affected negatively by draft system, so it 
decreases battle effectiveness. (Related item number 4) 
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b. Specialized Sergeant System Considerations 
  
Since Specialized Sergeant and Contracted officer systems are accepted as 
the last drives toward being a totally professional army, were questioned separately:  
     
     
     
     
 
% 68.7 of the managers see the 
Specialized Sergeant System as the 
first step toward Professional  Army.
        
        
        
        
 
   
60.1 % of  managers see Contracted 
Officer System as an important step 
toward Professional Army.  
        
       
 
In order to capture the perceptions about Specialized Sergeant 
System, considering point (3) in page 25, 5 questions were combined into 
composite index. The alpha value for this index is 0,6521, which is 
acceptable. According to our scale, the higher the composite score, the more 
the respondent is happy with the present practice of Specialized Sergeant 
System.  
The histogram for the composite index of Specialized Sergeant 
System considerations is presented below: 
thoughts
9,00
5,00
1,00
expectations
9,00
5,00
1,00
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Figure 5. Histogram For Composite Index Of Specialized Sergeant System 
Considerations 
Mean was found as 4,0, which is low. As a result, it is possible to say 
that, although in general Specialized Sergeant System is accepted as the first 
step thorough professinalization, there is a clear dissatisfaction with the 
present practice.  
Although it is not possible to explain all the reasons for unhappiness 
with the practice, the following finding may be a main reason: More than half 
of the managers (64.5%) believe that the applicants have not enough 
capability and qualifications.  
Items and other statistics were presented  below:  
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Component items: 
 
Frequency 
Percent 
(% of 
total) 
 
Mean* Std. 
Deviation
 
6. Specialized Sergeant recruitment 
is the first step for transforming the 
army into a professional one.  
 
1,00
3,00
5,00
7,00
9,00
45 
69 
39 
159 
177 
489 
 
9,2 
14,1 
8,0 
32,5 
36,2 
 
6,4479 
 
2,6546 
 
 
7. Specialized Sergeant System is 
running well. 
 
1,00
3,00
5,00
7,00
9,00
139 
170 
72 
80 
28  
489 
28,4 
34,8 
14,7 
16,4 
5,7 
 
3,7239 
 
2,4275 
 
 
8. Specialized Sergeant System 
increases the degree of readiness   
for war and efficiency in the battle. 
 
1,00 
3,00 
5,00 
7,00 
9,00 
 
35 
113 
71 
193 
177 
489 
 
7,2 
23,1 
14,5 
39,5 
15,7 
 
5,6708 
 
2,3936 
 
 
9. Applicants to become Specialized 
Sergeant have enough capability and 
qualifications. 
 
1,00 
3,00 
5,00 
7,00 
9,00 
 
124 
191 
78 
78 
18 
489 
 
25,4 
39,1 
16,0 
16,0 
3,7 
 
3,6708 
 
2,2561 
 
10. The present condition of 
Specialized Sergeant system 
implementation is enough and 
there is no need to improve. 
 
 
 
*Scale is 1 to 9 and 9=“strongly 
agree” 
 
 
 
 
 
1,00 
3,00 
5,00 
7,00 
9,00 
 
196 
191 
42 
37 
23 
489 
 
 
40,1 
39,1 
8,6 
7,6 
4,7 
 
2,9550 
 
2,2042 
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c. Contracted Officer System Considerations 
The other side of the coin is Contracted Officer System. Considering 
point (4) in page 27, 4 questions were combined into a composite index to 
capture the expectations about recently accepted system of Contracted 
Officers. The alpha value for the index is 0,8622.  
According to our scale, the higher the composite score, the more the 
respondent are optimistic about the future of practice of Contracted Officers. 
The histogram for the composite index of Contracted Officer System 
considerations was presented below: 
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Figure 6. Histogram For Composite Index Of Contracted Officer System 
Considerations 
The mean is 4,9, which is also low but not as much as the Specialized 
Sergeant System Considerations’ mean of 4,0. This shows us that there aren’t 
great expectations for recently constructed system. It may stem from the 
unhappiness with the present practice of Specialized Sergeant System.  
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Shortly it is possible to talk about a little optimistic approach for 
newly accepted system. It would be better to reinvestigate this system after 
implementation is underway. 
The component items and detailed statistics were presented below: 
 
Component items: 
 Frequency Percent 
(%  of 
total) 
 
Mean* Std. 
Deviat
ion 
 
 
11. Contracted Officer recruitment is an 
important step for transforming the 
army into professional one.  
 
1,00
3,00
5,00
7,00
   9,00
87 
76 
81 
119 
126 
489 
 
17,8 
15,5 
16,6 
24,3 
25,8 
 
 
 
5,4949 
 
 
2,8873
 
 
12. Contracted Officer system will be 
running system. 
 
1,00
3,00
5,00
7,00
9,00
99 
122 
119 
106 
43 
489 
 
20,2 
24,9 
24,3 
21,7 
8,8 
 
 
 
,4,765 
 
 
2,5000
 
13. Contracted Officer system will 
increase  the degree of readiness for war 
and efficiency in the battle. 
 
1,00
3,00
5,00
7,00
9,00
103 
110 
100 
101 
75 
489 
 
21,1 
22,5 
20,4 
20,7 
15,3 
 
 
4,7342 
 
 
2,7377
 
14. People having enough capability and
qualifications would apply for the 
Contracted Officer position. 
 
1,00
3,00
5,00
7,00
9,00
96 
126 
77 
87 
103 
489 
19,6 
25,8 
15,7 
17,8 
21,1 
 
 
4,8978 
 
 
2,8740
 
*Scale is 1 to 9 and 9 = “strongly agree”        
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4.2. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS COMPONENT: 
       In this section, the following points were discussed, 
 (1) The economy and military expenditures. 
 (2) Whether Professional army cost more or less than the present system. 
 (3) Whether Professional army system can be applicable in economic crisis. 
 (4) What kind of effects the professional army will have on the personnel and 
maintenance expenditures. 
 (5) Whether Turkish society will accept the professional army system. 
 (6) Whether recruiting from the multi-resource of workforce (instead of only 
military schools) could cause some communication or cultural problems within the 
army. 
 (7) The qualifications of applicants for professional. 
 
a. Economical Considerations 
Firstly, the economical considerations were investigated as one of 
external environment factor. The new structure will not necessarily be less 
expensive or even equal to the cost of the old structure but it should support 
significantly greater end results. Most respondents believe professional army 
would cost less for the country: 
    
    
    
20 Totally Professional 
army would cost less for the 
country. 
    
    Frequency Percent
    1 23 4,7
    3 28 5,7
    5 54 11
    7 126 25,8
    
9 258 52,8
VAR00020
9,00
7,00
5,00
3,00
1,00
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 Also military expenditures are an important part of government 
expenditures. When the respondents were asked about whether governments 
should decrease their spending on military expenditures to make the economy 
powerful, they responded as: 
 
    
     
     
     
15 Nowadays governments have to 
spend less for military expenditures 
in order to strength their economies.
        
     Frequency    Percent 
     1 61 12,5 % 
     2 1 0,2 % 
     3 40 8,2 % 
     5 36 7,4 % 
     7 117 23,9 % 
     9 234 47,9 % 
        
        
        
  On the other hand, most of the respondents believe that 
professional army costs not so much to establish even considering today’s 
economical conditions so establishing a professional army will not be 
luxurious considering today’s economical considerations. 
    
    
    
19 Nowadays constructing a 
totally Professional army  is a   
luxury considering the 
economical conditions of the 
country. 
       
     Frequency Percent 
    1 1       232 47,4 % 
    3 2       111 22,7 % 
    5 3         65 13,3 % 
    7 4         54 11 % 
    9 5         27 5,5 % 
 
VAR00015
9,00
7,00
5,00
3,00
2,00
1,00
VAR00019
9,00
7,00
5,00
3,00
1,00
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In order to capture the perceptions about Cultural considerations, with 
regard to points (1), (2),(3) and (4) in page 34, 5 questions were combined 
into composite index. The alpha value for the index is 0,7011, which is 
acceptable. Considering the economical benefits of professionalization, it is 
clearly accepted that professional army is accepted to be more economical. 
The histogram for the composite index of Economical Considerations was 
presented below: 
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  Figure 7. Histogram For Composite Index Of Economical Considerations 
Related questionnaire items and descriptive statistics were presented 
and then the findings were discussed below: 
 
Component  items: 
 Frequency Percent 
(% of total) 
 
 
Mean*
Std. 
Deviation
 
16. High-tech weapons and weapon 
systems have to be used by 
professional personnel. 
 
1,00
3,00
5,00
7,00
9,00
 
2 
21 
4 
67 
395 
489 
 
0,4 
4,3 
0,8 
13,7 
80,8 
 
 
 
8,4029 
 
 
1,4610 
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17. Transforming army into totally 
professional will cause a decrease in 
personnel expenditures. 
 
1,00
3,00
5,00
7,00
9,004
4 
19 
26 
110 
330 
489 
0,8 
3,9 
5,3 
22,5 
67,5 
 
 
 
8,0389 
 
 
1,6597 
 
18. Transforming army into totally 
professional will cause a decrease in 
maintenance expenditures. 
 
1,00
3,00
5,00
7,00
9,004
7 
6 
20 
89 
367 
489 
1,4 
1,2 
4,1 
18,2 
75,1 
 
 
8,2843 
 
 
1,4942 
 
 
20. Totally Professional army would 
cost less for the country. 
 
1,00
3,00
5,00
7,00
9,004
23 
28 
54 
126 
258 
489 
4,7 
5,7 
11,0 
25,8 
52,8 
 
 
 
7,3231 
 
 
2,2511 
21. Transforming army into totally 
professional will cause private sector 
personnel, who are not obliged to serve 
in the army, to contribute country 
economy more. 
1,00
3,00
5,00
7,00
9,004
19 
33 
52 
139 
246 
489 
3,9 
6,7 
10,6 
28,4 
50,3 
 
 
7,2904 
 
 
2,2004 
     
*Scale is 1 to 9 and 9 = “strongly agree” 
 
 
 
If the statistics are carefully examined, the following results can be obtained: 
• 80,0 % of the respondents expect that transforming army into totally 
professional will cause a decrease in personnel expenditures number of 
military personnel due to expected decline in personnel number. (Related 
item number 17) 
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• 93,3 % of the respondents wait that transforming army into totally 
professional will cause a decrease in maintenance expenditures due to 
professional usage of systems by the professional system. (Related item 
number 18) 
• There is a clear agreement on those high-tech weapons and weapon systems 
have to be used by professional personnel. (Related item number 16) 
• The agreement is also true for the idea that private sector personnel, who 
are not obliged to serve in the army, to contribute country economy more. 
(Related item number 21) 
b. Cultural Considerations 
In order to capture the perceptions about Cultural considerations, with 
regard to points (5), (6) and (7) ‘n page 34, 5 questions were combined into 
composite index. The alpha value for the index is 0,7011, which is 
acceptable. 
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Figure 8. Histogram For Composite Index Of Cultural Considerations 
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  The mean of 4,5 implies the hesitations about the professional army 
system. It is also interesting that the ones who say that professional army will 
cause more hierarchy and conflict also say that recruitment of personnel from 
different resources may cause some adaptation problems. Those people are 
also pessimist about the expected applicants for these positions. The inter-
correlations between these variables were shown below: 
 Correlations between variables 24, 25 and 26: 
VAR00024 VAR00025 VAR00026 
VAR00024 Pearson Correlation 1,000 ,566** ,382** 
Sig. (2-tailed) , ,000 ,000 
N 489 489 489 
VAR00025 Pearson Correlation ,566** 1,000 ,521** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 , ,000 
N 489 489 489 
VAR00026 Pearson Correlation ,382** ,521** 1,000 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 , 
N 489 489 489 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Descriptive data were presented and the findings were discussed below: 
 
Component items: 
  
Frequen
cy 
Percent 
(% of 
total) 
 
Mean* 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
 
 
22. Army will lost its training and 
education center property after 
transformation into totally professional 
system. 
 
1,00 
3,00 
5,00 
7,00 
9,00 
131 
132 
53 
105 
68 
489 
 
26,8 
27,0 
10,8 
21,5 
13,9 
 
 
4,3742 
 
 
2,8416 
 
 
23. People would not be happy for 
abolishing the draft system since they 
see it as a way of becoming a mature 
person anymore. 
 
1,00 
3,00 
5,00 
7,00 
9,00 
 
152 
130 
71 
86 
50 
 
31,1 
26,6 
17,6 
14,5 
10,2 
 
 
 
3,9857 
 
 
 
2,7134 
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24. Positions as Specialized Sergeant, 
Contracted Officer etc. will cause more 
hierarchy and conflict. 
 
1,00 
3,00 
5,00 
7,00 
9,00 
64 
72 
99 
108 
146 
489 
 
13,1 
14,7 
20,2 
22,1 
29,9 
 
 
 
5,7076
 
 
2,8426 
 
 
25. During transformation process, 
recruitment of personnel from different 
resources may cause some adaptation 
problems. 
 
1,00 
3,00 
5,00 
7,00 
9,00 
25 
44 
85 
174 
161 
489 
 
   5,1 
9,0 
17,4 
35,6 
32,9 
 
 
6,4765
 
 
2,4570 
 
 
26. Applicants for a totally professional 
army largely would be from low-level 
economic class and unemployed people.  
 
1,00 
3,00 
5,00 
7,00 
9,00 
27 
34 
60 
137 
231 
489 
   5,5 
7,0 
12,3 
28,0 
47,2 
 
 
6,9836
 
 
2,4761 
 
*Scale is 1 to 9 and 9 = “strongly agree” 
If the statistics are carefully examined, the following results can be obtained: 
• The doubts about whether society will not accept that new 
professional army in which not all men are asked for military service 
is generally rejected and respondents stated that society is ready for 
transformation. (Related item number is 23) 
• Although not so much clear, they also do not agree that the army will 
lose its training and education center property after transformation 
into totally professional system. (Related item number is 22) 
• Positions as Specialized Sergeant, Contracted Officer etc. will cause 
more hierarchy so most of the respondents (52%) believe in that 
recruiting from the multi-resource of workforce (instead of only 
military schools) could cause higher conflict. 78,5 % of the 
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respondents also say that during transformation process, recruitment 
of personnel from different resources may cause some adaptation 
problems. (Related items are 24 and 25) 
• In professional armies, the personnel paid for their military 
occupation than this may lead society think that only the ones who are 
in need of money ask for jobs. We see that the expectations are on that 
way: 77,2 % of respondents believes that applicants for a totally 
professional army largely would be from low-level economic class 
and unemployed people. (Related item number is 26) 
 
4. 3. INPUT COMPONENT  
        In this section, the followings points were discussed, 
 (1) What managers think about the human-asset of the organization (especially with 
regard to country’s manpower potential)? 
 (2) What they think about army’s attractiveness for the ones they want to include in 
the army?  
 (3) If they think that they could select new-recruits whom they are looking for.    
   In order to capture the perceptions about Provision of Human 
Resources, with regard to points (1), (2) and (3) above, 5 questions were 
combined into composite index. The alpha value for this index is 0,6690, 
which is acceptable.  
The histogram for the composite index of draft system considerations 
was presented below:  
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 Figure 9. Histogram For Composite Index Of Input Considerations   
All these arguments were supported by the 6,6 mean of composite 
index. Almost all the managers told that Turkish Military Forces could find 
qualified manpower to recruit within the country. Descriptive statistics were 
shown below: 
 
Component  items: 
 
Frequency 
Percent 
(% of 
total) 
 
Mean* 
Std. 
Deviation
 
 
27. Turkey has enough qualified 
manpower potential required by the 
army. 
 
1,00 
3,00 
5,00 
7,00 
9,00 
 
 
20 
63 
27 
148 
231 
489 
4,1
12,9
5,5
30,3
47,2
 
 
7,0736 2,3770
 
28. Army is an outstanding 
organization, which is preferred by 
qualified manpower taking 
precedence. 
 
1,00 
3,00 
5,00 
7,00 
9,00 
 
 
21 
86 
58 
122 
202 
489 
4,3
17,6
11,9
24,9
41,3
 
 
6,6278 2,5221
 
29. Army is preferred by qualified 
manpower taking precedence due to 
the advantages offered. 
 
1,00 
3,00 
5,00 
7,00 
9,00 
31 
72 
64 
145 
177 
6,3
14,7
13,1
29,7
16,2
 
 
6,4928 2,5229
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30. Army’s education and training 
system is good enough to bring up its 
professional personnel for branches in 
need. 
 
1,00 
3,00 
5,00 
7,00 
9,00 
 
 
29 
70 
57 
156 
177 
489 
5,9 
14,3 
11,7 
31,9 
36,2 
 
 
6,5624 
 
 
2,4820
 
31. While transforming the army into a 
totally professional one, the recruitment 
of qualified manpower will not be a 
problem. 
 
1,00 
3,00 
5,00 
7,00 
9,00 
37 
78 
75 
165 
134 
489 
7,6 
16,0 
15,3 
33,7 
27,4 
 
 
6,1493 
 
 
2,5050
 
*Scale is 1 to 9 and 9 = “strongly agree” 
 
If the statistics are carefully examined, the following results can be obtained: 
• Turkey has enough qualified manpower potential required by the 
army. (Related item number is 27) 
• Army is an outstanding organization, which is preferred by qualified 
manpower taking precedence. (Related item number is 28) 
• Army is preferred by qualified manpower taking precedence due to 
the offered advantages. (Related item number is 29) 
• Army has its own military high schools or war academies so bringing 
up the personnel who are needed is a matter of its own.  Respondents 
believe that army can do that. (Related item number is 30) 
• These respondents also believe that during transformation the 
recruitment of qualified manpower will not be a problem. (Related 
item number is 31) 
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4.4. OUTPUT COMPONENT:  
In this section, the following points were discussed, 
 (1) How will the new professional system affect the overall success with regard to 
mobilization times? 
 (2) Considering the present practice of draft system what effect have conscripts on 
battle efficiency? 
  (3) What the managers guess for the degree of deterrence of the professional army 
to prevent a possible war? 
 In order to capture the perceptions about Draft System, with regard to points 
(1), (2) and (3) above, 3 questions were combined into composite index. The alpha 
value for this index is 0,5178, which is acceptable.  
The histogram for the composite index of draft system considerations was 
presented below: 
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 Figure 9. Histogram For Composite Index Of Input Considerations   
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Descriptive statistics were presented below: 
 
Component items 
  
Frequency
Percent 
(% of 
total) 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
32. Totally professional army is not 
appropriate system considering 
mobilization times and the need for 
reserve forces and their training  
 
1,00
3,00
5,00
7,00
9,00
 
 
61 
125 
96 
112 
95 
489 
12,5 
25,6 
19,6 
22,9 
19,4 
 
 
5,2249 
 
 
2,6470 
 
 
33. Draft personnel negatively affect 
the degree of army’s battle 
efficiency. 
 
1,00
3,00
5,00
7,00
9,00
 
62 
99 
80 
138 
110 
489 
 
12,7 
20,2 
16,4 
28,2 
22,5 
 
 
5,5521 
 
 
2,6975 
 
 
34. Professional Army system makes 
the army more deterrent 
1,00
3,00
5,00
7,00
9,00
 
 
31 
26 
49 
127 
256 
489 
6,3 
5,3 
10,0 
26,0 
52,4 
 
 
7,2536 
 
 
2,3611 
   At first we asked the opinions of participants think about the chance 
of success in the conditions of professional Army in a war that the whole 
country must participate rather than the small war in regional area. As you 
may notice: 
• There is no general agreement whether professional army causes only 
some of the citizens to be trained since compulsory service will be over 
and only professionally will get training. (Related item number is 32) 
• There is again no general agreement will result in a decrease at the 
chance of success considering a war that need all men to be soldiers. 
(Related item number is 33) 
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• But there is a clear agreement about the idea that the professional army 
system makes the army more deterrent. (Related item number is 34) 
      Above all, although there was no doubt about the idea that 
“Professional Army system makes the army more deterrent”, the 
conscripts cannot be seen as the only reason for battle inefficiency 
considering the low mean for the idea  “Draft personnel negatively affect 
the degree of army’s battle efficiency”. 
 
4.5. FUTURE EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE SYSTEM:  
           However, it is still questionable whether personnel want transformation to 
professional system or not? There is a possibility of resistance to change. 
So we have given 3 choices in questionnaire as totally professional system, 
semi professional system or none of two but the old system. It is found that managers 
believe that in the future army must transform into totally professional system. On 
the other hand, there are still arguments about whether the semi professional system 
could be much more useful or not. exact percentages about the system expectations 
were presented below: 
(1) 61,3 % says that in the end we should transform into totally professional system. 
(2) Only 13,7 % believes in that the current system is not enough to solve problems. 
(3) 58,7 % believe that semi-professional system can be a more useful solution when 
30% do not believe and 11,2% has no idea. 
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The detailed statistics were presented below: 
 Descriptive Statistics:  Frequency Percent 
(% of 
total) 
 
Mean Std. 
Deviation
 
35. The draft system should be 
implemented without considering 
revising the system to totally 
professional.  
 
1,00
3,00
5,00
7,00
9,00
 
267 
108 
47 
49 
18 
489 
 
54,6 
22,1 
9,6 
10,0 
3,7 
 
 
7,2781 
 
 
2,3304 
 
36. Semi-professional system that has 
higher number of professionals and 
fewer periods for draftees would be 
much more beneficial than the present 
system.  
 
1,00
3,00
5,00
7,00
9,00
 
76 
71 
55 
112 
175 
489 
 
15,5 
14,5 
11,2 
22,9 
35,8 
 
 
5,9775 
 
 
2,9618 
 
37. Abolishing draft personnel and 
recruiting all-professional army would 
be more beneficial. 
 
 
 
1,00
3,00
5,00
7,00
9,00
52 
65 
72 
113 
187 
489 
10,6 
13,3 
14,7 
23,1 
38,2 
 
 
6,3006 
 
 
2,7568 
 
4.6. DIFFERENTIATION AMONGST SUBGROUPS ACCORDING TO    
MANAGEMENT LEVELS 
  The sample is coded as 1 for up-level managers, 2 for mid-level managers 
and 3 for low-level managers. Then one-way ANOVA test was used to identify if 
there is any perception differences considering Draft system, Specialized Sergeant 
system, Contracted Officer system, economical and cultural factors, manpower 
potential as input, battle efficiency as output.  
  These dimensions and mean comparison test scores were presented below: 
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Table 2. Differentiation Within Subgroups According To Draft System 
Considerations 
 
DRAFT SYSTEM 
CONSIDERATIONS 
 
General 
score: 
 
Upper-
level 
 
Mid- 
level 
 
Lower- 
level 
 
F 
 
Sig. 
1. Draft personnel are 
self-motivated enough to 
be trained and to 
accomplish their duties. 6,2802 5,6829 6,2542 6,3636 1,334 0,264 
2. Periodical change in 
draftees has a bad effect 
on performance. 7,667 7,1463 7,7797 7,6709 1,863 0,156 
3. Use of vehicles, 
materials and weapons 
by draftees decreases 
efficiency. 7,3436 7,3415 7,2373 7,3818 0,195 0,823 
4. Draft system 
negatively affects the 
degree of army’s 
readiness for a war. 6,3333 5,878 6,2881 6,4061 0,868 0,421 
5. The problems faced 
nowadays can be solved 
in draft system without 
considering revising the 
system to totally 
professional. 
 
 
 
 
7,1063 
 
 
 
6,8049 
 
 
 
7,3220 
 
 
 
7,0667 
 
 
 
0,910 
 
 
 
 
0,403 
Estimated total scores:  6,946 6,5707 6,9763 6,9818 1,566 0,210 
( Significant differentiation was demonstrated by * ) 
No significant differentiation was found between respondents according to their 
management levels for draft system considerations. 
 
 
 
 52
Table 3. Differentiation Within Subgroups According To Specialized 
Sergeant System Considerations 
 
SPECIALIZED SERGEANT 
SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS
 
General 
score: 
 
Upper
- 
level 
 
Mid- 
level 
 
Lower
- 
level 
 
F 
 
Sig. 
6. Specialized Sergeant 
recruitment is the first step for 
transforming the army into a 
professional one. 
 
 
 
6,4479 6,0244 6,4576 6,497 0,578 0,561 
7. Specialized Sergeant System 
is running well. 
 
3,7239 3,5854 4,2203 3,5636 3,284* 0,038 
8. Specialized Sergeant System  
increases the degree of readiness 
for war and efficiency in the 
battle. 
  
  
 
 5,6708 4,7561 5,6102 5,8061 3,596* 0,028 
9. Applicants to become 
Specialized Sergeant have 
enough capability and 
qualifications. 
 
 
 
3,6708 3,7805 3,6949 3,6485 0,071 0,931 
10. The present condition of 
Specialized Sergeant system 
implementation is enough and 
there is no need to improve. 
 
 
 
2,955 2,8537 2,8983 2,9879 0,119 0,888 
Estimated total  scores:  4,001 3,7439 4,1059 4,0015 1,566 0,210 
( Significant differentiation was demonstrated by * ) 
• Lower-level and upper-level managers are more dissatisfied with the 
execution of the Specialized Sergeant System than the mid-level managers. 
• Upper-level managers are more suspicious than the lower-level managers 
considering the idea that the Specialized Sergeant System increases the 
degree of readiness for war and battle efficiency in the battle. 
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Table 4. Differentiation Within Subgroups According To Contracted Officer 
System Considerations 
CONTRACTED 
OFFICER SYSTEM      
CONSIDERATIONS 
General 
score 
Upper-
level 
Mid-
level 
Lower-
level F Sig. 
11. Contracted Officer 
recruitment is an 
important step for 
transforming the army 
into professional one. 
 
5,4949 5,0488 
 
 
6,4576 5,2061 8,985* 0,000
 
12. Contracted Officer 
system will be running 
well. 
 
4,4765 4,561 5,3051 4,1697 9,295* 0,000
13. Contracted Officer 
system will increase the 
degree of readiness for 
war and efficiency in the 
battle. 
 
4,7342 
 
4,2683 5,661 
 
4,6606 9,310* 0,000
14. People having enough 
capability and 
qualifications would 
apply for the Contracted 
Officer position. 
 
4,8978 
 
4,2195 5,8136
 
4,6545 8,572* 0,000
Estimated total scores 4,9008 4,5244 5,8093 4,6227 12,561* 0,000
( Significant differentiation was demonstrated by *) 
• Mid-level managers give more importance to the recently accepted 
Contracted officer System when compared to upper and lower-level 
managers. 
• Mid-level managers are relatively more optimistic considering the idea that 
the Contracted Officer System would be executed healthily. 
• Mid-level managers are more optimistic than the upper and lower-level 
managers considering the idea that the Contracted Officer system will 
increase the degree of readiness for war and efficiency in the battle. 
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• Mid-level managers are again more optimistic than the upper and lower-level 
managers considering the idea that qualified people would apply for the 
Contracted officer position. 
Generally ideas of mid-level managers are different from upper and lower-
level managers concerning the Contracted Officer System. They have more 
optimistic expectations about the future of the Contracted Officer System. 
Table 5. Differentiation Within Subgroups According To Economical 
Considerations 
 
ECONOMICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
 
General 
score: 
 
Upper-
level 
 
Mid- 
level 
 
Lower- 
level 
 
F 
 
Sig. 
16 High-tech weapons and 
weapon systems have to be 
used by professional 
personnel. 
 
 
 
8,4029 8,1707 8,7119 8,3212 3,713* 0,025 
17 Transforming army into 
totally professional will cause 
a decrease in personnel 
expenditures. 
 
 
 
8,0389 7,9268 8,2542 7,9758 1,327 0,266 
18 Transforming army into 
totally professional will cause 
a decrease in maintenance 
expenditures. 
 
 
 
 
8,2843 8,122 8,5593 8,2061 2,712 0,067 
20 Totally Professional army 
would cost less for the 
country. 
 
 
7,3231 7,0976 7,4915 7,2909 0,569 0,567 
21 Transforming army into 
totally professional will cause 
private sector personnel, who 
are not obliged to serve in the 
army, to contribute country 
economy more. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7,2904 6,9024 7,4237 7,2909 0,853 0,427 
Estimated total scores: 8,8681 7,6439 8,0881 7,8113 3,248* 0,004 
( Significant differentiation was demonstrated by *) 
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• Upper-level managers seek professional personnel for operating high-tech 
weapon systems relatively more than the mid and lower-level managers. 
• Generally mid-level managers believe in economical utility of the 
professional army system relatively more, when compared to upper and 
lower-level managers. 
 
Table 6. Differentiation Within Subgroups According To Cultural 
Considerations 
CULTURAL 
CONSIDERATIONS  
         
General 
score  
Upper-
level 
Mid-
level 
Lower-
level F Sig. 
22 Army will lost its 
training and education 
center property after 
transformation into totally 
professional system. 
 
4.3742 
 
4,3659 5,678 5,7636 4,502* 0,012
23 People would not be 
happy for abolishing the 
draft system since they see it 
as a way of becoming a 
mature person. 
3.9857 4.0244 3.9322 4,000 0,032 0,969
24 Positions as Specialized 
Sergeant, Contracted Officer 
etc. will cause more 
hierarchy and conflict. 
 
 
5,7076 5.4878 5.2881 5.8848 2,058 0,129
25 During transformation 
process, recruitment of 
personnel from different 
resources may cause some 
adaptation problems. 
 
 
6,4765 7.8293 6.1525 6.5273 2,035 0,132
26 Applicants for a totally 
professional army largely 
would be from low-level 
economic class and 
unemployed people.  
 
 
6,9836 6.8049 6.8644 7.0485 0,356 0,701
Estimated total scores 4,495 4,2098 4,6881 4,4606 1,251 0,287
( Significant differentiation was demonstrated by *) 
 56
The only significant differentiation is between upper-level managers and 
others: Upper-level managers hesitate less concerning the idea that army will 
lost its training and education center property after transformation into totally 
professional one. 
 Table 7. Differentiation Within Subgroups According To Input (Provision Of 
Human Resources) Considerations 
 
INPUT 
CONSIDERATIONS 
 
General
score: 
 
Upper-
level 
 
Mid- 
level 
 
Lower- 
level 
 
F 
 
Sig. 
27. Turkey has enough 
qualified manpower 
potential required by the 
army. 
 
 
 
7,0736 7,439 7,2203 6,9758 0,989 0,373 
28. Army is an 
outstanding organization, 
which is preferred by 
qualified manpower 
taking precedence. 
 
 
 
 
6,6278 6,1220 6,2034 6,8424 3,731* 0,025 
29. Army is preferred by 
qualified manpower 
taking precedence due to 
the advantages offered. 
 
 
 
6,4928 6,1701 6,0169 6,7030 3,617* 0,028 
30. Army’s education and 
training system is good 
enough to bring up its 
professional personnel for 
branches in need. 
 
 
 
 
6,5624 7,1463 6,1356 6,6424 3,077* 0,047 
31. While transforming 
the army into a totally 
professional one, the 
recruitment of qualified 
manpower will not be a 
problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
6,1493 6,1707 6,2203 6,1212 0,069 0,933 
 
Estimated total  scores:  6,5812 6,6098 6,3593 6,657 1,462 0,233 
 
( Significant differentiation was demonstrated by *) 
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• As it can be understood from the mean differences, lower-level managers 
see army as more attractive than the mid and upper-level managers for the 
expected volunteers.  
• Upper-level managers have higher confidence for the Army schools to 
bring up the needed personnel. 
 
Table 8. Differentiation Within Subgroups According To Output (Battle 
Efficiency) Considerations 
 
OUTPUT 
CONSIDERATIONS 
 
General
score: 
 
Upper-
level 
 
Mid- 
level 
 
Lower- 
level 
 
F 
 
Sig. 
32 Totally professional 
army is not appropriate 
system considering 
mobilization times and 
the need for reserve 
forces and their training.  
 
 
 
 
 
4,751 5,000 4,9492 6,9758 4,6848 0,553 
33 Draft personnel 
negatively affect the 
degree of army’s battle 
efficiency. 
 
 
 
5,5521 5,0976  6,2034 5,3758 4,8* 0,009 
34 Professional Army 
system makes the army 
more deterrent.  
 
 
7,2536 6,7073 7,4915 7,2364 1,71 0,182 
 
Estimated total scores:  5,8603 5,6016 6,2147 5,7657 3,884* 0,021 
(Significant differentiation was demonstrated by *) 
• Mid-level managers are more dissatisfied with the performance of draft 
personnel than upper and lower-level managers. 
• Generally mid-level managers are more optimistic than others concerning the 
overall efficiency in the battle with the totally professional army. 
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Table 9. Differentiation Within Subgroups According To Military System 
Preferences 
 
OUTPUT 
CONSIDERATIONS 
 
General
score: 
 
Upper-
level 
 
Mid- 
level 
 
Lower- 
level 
 
F 
 
Sig. 
35. The draft system 
should be implemented 
without considering 
revising the system to 
totally professional 
 
 
 
 
7,2781 
 
 
 
 
7,1951 
 
 
 
 
7,4579 
 
 
 
 
7,2247 0,463 0,63 
36. Semi-professional 
system that has higher 
number of professionals 
and fewer periods for 
draftees would be much 
more beneficial than the 
present system.. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5,9775 6,2683  6,4237 5,7818 2,269 0,105 
37. Abolishing draft 
personnel and recruiting 
all-professional army 
would be more beneficial.  
 
 
 
6,3006 6,1707  5,9327 6,4485 1,578 0,208 
No significant differentiation was found between respondents according to their 
military system preferences 
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V. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
     
    5.1. Conclusions and Implications 
 Change has always been very difficult for military institutions and 
decisions about change have always been risky. History abounds with examples of 
armies that lost because they did not change or they made the wrong changes. The 
Turkish Army has begun to transform itself from a Cold War-oriented force into a 
more rapidly deployable and responsive force in order to meet the diverse defense 
challenges of the future.  
 More importantly, the task of maintaining the Army's effectiveness is 
becoming increasingly more difficult due to the fact that we must now make choices 
about change at an accelerating rate against a wide sort of uncertainties. The far-
reaching organizational and operational changes that the Army plans will virtually 
affect every element of the Army. 
 This study tried to assess the Turkish Army’s management of 
transformation efforts with a survey on the key components of an open-system 
model. There are several implications of the findings from the survey: 
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(1) Recruiting people for the Army is an important factor to be taken into 
account when constituting professional army, and respondents are sure that 
the army can find qualified people to recruit.  
(2) Moreover, respondents largely believe that there might be some adaptation 
problems and conflicts between the personnel from military schools and the 
personnel from other backgrounds when new system is established.  
(3) Although almost everybody believe that the draft system should be revised, 
there is no consensus on whether it should be totally a professional or a semi-
professional system. The evaluation of Specialized Sergeant and Contracted 
Officer Systems, which are considered as steps toward professionalization, is 
not very positive reveals the hesitations of the respondents. 
(4)  There is no general agreement on whether professional army may cause 
problems at mobilization times, especially considering a national war when 
reserve forces are needed. But there is a common consensus on the idea that 
becoming professional makes the Army more deterrent than now.  
(5) Most respondents believe that a cut in military expenditures will help the 
economy and a professional army may cost less for the country. There is also 
clear agreement that personnel and maintenance expenditures would 
decrease in a professional system. So we can say that respondents believe 
that professionalization is seen as more economical and cost saving. 
(6) The doubts about whether society may accept the new professional army in 
which not all men are required to serve for military service are clearly 
rejected as respondents stated that society is ready for transformation of the 
Turkish Army. 
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    So these findings should be taken into consideration when planning a 
transformation of the Army into a  professional system. 
       5.2. Limitations of the current study 
            It should be noted that the aim of this study is not to support any kind of 
military systems. Rather, it aims to find out the ideas and attitudes of managers 
toward being a totally professional army. Based on this aim, the survey on the 
perceptions toward the professional army system was evaluated only through the 
information given by respondents to close-ended questions.  
          This survey had to leave out some of the issues that may be relevant. 
Although there is no ideal length for a survey, it is preferred that it should not be too 
long considering the probability that the respondent will be bored so that he or she 
might answer carelessly. A number of factors affect the transformation process, such 
as cost concerns, legal and administrative issues. Hence it was not possible to 
analyze all aspects of the subject. We do not think that a shorter questionnaire could 
be prepared for the research, but each factor can be researched separately from the 
others, which will heavily expand the coverage of this study. Thus, more questions 
about each factor will yield more reliable results. Some of these factors to be studied 
are discussed in the following section. 
  The generalization of the findings from a study of the sample to the 
population is dependent on its representativeness. We have a sample size of 489, 
which is quite large. However, another limitation may be the cluster sampling used in 
the study. Sekeran (1999) notes: “While using cluster sampling, there is always a 
possibility of not reaching a cluster containing heterogeneous elements in the 
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population." (p. 275). So by further replicating the study with other cluster-samples, 
it can be seen if the conditions of intro-cluster heterogeneity or inter-cluster 
homogeneity are met.  
In order to reach a more comprehensive view of perceptions about 
professional army system, additional data from several different segments of the 
society may be needed. The present study only reflects perceptions of a single sector. 
Many people (especially males who are at the age cohort of military conscription and 
organizations in Turkey such as administrators, economists and academicians are 
concerned about the topic. A thorough awareness of their opinions will provide 
decision makers with better information. 
5.3. Recommendations for further studies 
Perceptions can change as time passes.  Repeating the study during and 
after the transformation to professional army will be valuable in understanding the 
change in the perceptions of the participants. To give an example, we found that 
according to respondents, AVF is more economical than the present system. When 
we investigate their ideas about the economics of AVF after the transformation is 
underway, we may easily see whether their perceptions will change or not by 
comparing with our present findings.  
A broadening of the research perspective may also draw attention to some 
neglected areas of study such as cost concerns, administrative and legal dimensions 
as well as social ones. Future research would be worthwhile on these subjects and 
deserves further study. For example, especially a cost-effectiveness analysis for the 
expected professional army would be valuable. Another area for future research is to 
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diagnose the perceptions of administrators, since they have the authority to end the 
conscription. Also there are some points to argue since our subject has legal 
constraints. Compulsory military service is embedded in the Constitution of Turkish 
Republic. Every male citizen has a right and duty to serve in the military, though it 
does not exactly specify conscription, draft or any other method. The constitution 
leaves the description of the manner in which this service is rendered to the 
subordinate laws. 
Finally, civilians generally feel that military people can better solve military 
issues. However, in today’s environment, every agency needs independent studies 
that will help to find most efficient policies. In the absence of scientific analysis, 
nobody can evaluate decision alternatives in a healthy manner. Therefore, civilian 
and military officials should encourage universities, research agencies, and 
academicians to study national defense, which will eventually lead to construct more 
detailed surveys to capture all aspects of the subject discussed in the study.  
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APPENDIX A: THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME OR SURNAME TO KEEP SECRECY AND 
ONLY CIRCLE ONE CHOICE. 
Use the following to indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statements:    
A To a very great extent 
  B To a great extent 
  C Neither agree nor disagree  
  D To a small extent 
  E To no extent 
 
 
 
A.  SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS 
 1. DRAFT SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS  
(1) Draft personnel are self-motivated enough to be trained and to accomplish their 
duties. 
(2) Periodical change in draftees has a bad effect on performance. 
(3) Use of vehicles, materials and weapons by draftees decreases efficiency. 
(4) Draft system negatively affects the degree of army’s readiness for a war.  
(5) The problems faced nowadays can be solved in draft system without considering 
revising the system to totally professional. 
 
 2. SPECIALIZED SERGEANT SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS 
(6) Specialized Sergeant recruitment is the first step for transforming the army into a 
professional one.  
(7) Specialized Sergeant System is running well. 
(8) Specialized Sergeant System increases the degree of readiness for war and 
efficiency in the battle.  
(9) Applicants to become Specialized Sergeant have enough capability and 
qualifications. 
(10) The present condition of Specialized Sergeant system implementation is 
enough and there is no need to improve. 
 
  3. CONTRACTED OFFICER SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS 
(11) Contracted Officer recruitment is an important step for transforming the army 
into professional one.  
(12) Contracted Officer system will be running well. 
(13) Contracted Officer system will increase the degree of readiness for war and 
efficiency in the battle. 
(14) People having enough capability and qualifications would apply for the 
Contracted Officer position. 
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B. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT:  ECONOMICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
(15) Nowadays governments must spend less for military expenditures in order to 
strength their economies. 
(16) High-tech weapons and weapon systems have to be used by professional 
personnel. 
(17) Transforming army into totally professional will cause a decrease in 
personnel expenditures. 
(18) Transforming army into totally professional will cause a decrease in 
maintenance expenditures. 
(19) Nowadays constructing a totally professional army is a luxury considering the 
economical conditions of the country. 
(20) Totally Professional army would cost less for the country. 
(21) Transforming army into totally professional will cause private sector 
personnel, who are not obliged to serve in the army, to contribute country 
economy more. 
 
2. INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT: CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS 
(22) Army will lost its training and education center property after transformation 
into totally professional system. 
(23) People would not be happy for abolishing the draft system since they see it as 
a way of becoming mature person. 
(24) Positions as Specialized Sergeant, Contracted Officer etc. will cause more 
hierarchy and conflict. 
(25) During transformation process, recruitment of personnel from different 
resources may cause some adaptation problems. 
(26) Applicants for a totally professional army largely would be from low-level 
economic class and unemployed people.  
 
 
 
C. SYSTEM EXPECTATIONS 
 1. ABOUT PROVISION OF HUMAN RESOURCES 
(27) Turkey has enough qualified manpower potential required by the army. 
(28) Army is an outstanding organization, which is preferred by qualified 
manpower taking precedence. 
(29) Army is preferred by qualified manpower taking precedence due to the 
advantages offered. 
(30) Army’s education and training system is well enough to bring up its 
professional personnel for branches in need. 
(31) While transforming the army into a totally professional one, the recruitment 
of qualified manpower will not be a problem. 
 
2. ABOUT BATTLE EFFICIENCY 
(32) Totally professional army is not appropriate system considering mobilization 
times and the need for reserve forces and their training  
(33) Draft personnel negatively affect the degree of army’s battle efficiency. 
(34) Professional Army system makes the army more deterrent. 
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3. ABOUT SYSTEM PREFERENCES 
(35) The draft system should be implemented without considering revising the 
system to totally professional. 
(36) Semi-professional system that has higher number of professionals and fewer 
periods for draftees would be much more beneficial than the present system  
(37) Abolishing draft personnel and recruiting all-professional army would be 
more beneficial. 
 
PUT X TO THE POSITION THAT IS APPROPRIATE FOR YOU: 
(    )  Up-Level Manager 
(    )  Mid-Level Manager 
(    )  Low-Level Manager 
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APPENDIX B: ANOVA TABLE AND POST-HOC MULTIPLE 
COMPARISONS FOR  MANAGEMENT LEVELS  
 Sample  was coded as  1 for up-level managers, 2 for mid-level managers and 
3 for low-level managers. Then one-way ANOVA test was used  to identify  if there 
is any perception differences considering draft system, Specialized Sergeant system, 
Contracted Officer system, economical and cultural factors, manpower potential as 
input, battle efficiency as output. These dimensions and mean comparison test scores 
were presented below: 
ANOVA TABLE 
Sum of 
Squares
df Mean 
Square 
F Significance 
DRAFT Between Groups 6,305 2 3,153 1,566 ,210 
Within Groups 978,509 486 2,013   
Total 984,815 488    
SERGEANT Between Groups 4,357 2 2,178 ,871 ,419 
Within Groups 1215,073 486 2,500   
Total 1219,430 488    
*OFFICER Between Groups 128,725 2 64,362 12,561 ,000 
Within Groups 2490,215 486 5,124   
Total 2618,940 488    
ECONOMY Between Groups 8,626 2 4,313 3,248 ,040 
Within Groups 645,436 486 1,328   
Total 654,062 488    
CULTURE Between Groups 8,128 2 4,064 1,251 ,287 
Within Groups 1578,267 486 3,247   
Total 1586,395 488    
INPUT Between Groups 7,737 2 3,869 1,462 ,233 
Within Groups 1286,330 486 2,647   
Total 1294,067 488    
*OUTPUT Between Groups 20,519 2 10,260 3,884 ,021 
Within Groups 1283,821 486 2,642   
Total 1304,340 488  
 
According to table, there are some perception differences within the sub-
groups of up-level, mid-level, high-level managers. These   dimensions are about 
Contracted officer System and the output. Subgroup differences were discussed in 
detail below: 
Multiple Comparisons  
[(Scheffe) 95% ConfidenceInterval] 
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Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
VAR00038 
(J) 
VAR00038
(I-J) Mean 
Difference 
 
Significance
 
Lower Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
DRAFT 1 2 -,4055 ,290 -1,0371 ,2261 
  3 -,4111 ,217 -,9880 ,1658 
 2 1 ,4055 ,290 -,2261 1,0371 
  3 -5,5470E-03 ,999 -,3792 ,3681 
 3 1 ,4111 ,217 -,1658 ,9880 
  2 5,547E-03 ,999 -,3681 ,3792 
SERGEANT 1 2 -,3763 ,423 -1,0801 ,3275 
  3 -,3006 ,518 -,9435 ,3423 
 2 1 ,3763 ,423 -,3275 1,0801 
  3 7,567E-02 ,905 -,3408 ,4921 
 3 1 ,3006 ,518 -,3423 ,9435 
  2 -7,5665E-02 ,905 -,4921 ,3408 
OFFICER 1 2 -1,2849* ,008 -2,2925 -,2774 
  3 -9,8337E-02 ,966 -1,0187 ,8220 
 2 1 1,2849* ,008 ,2774 2,2925 
  3 1,1866* ,000 ,5905 1,7827 
 3 1 9,834E-02 ,966 -,8220 1,0187 
  2 -1,1866* ,000 -1,7827 -,5905 
ECONOMY 1 2 -,4442 ,105 -,9572 6,872E-02
  3 -,1734 ,662 -,6419 ,2952 
 2 1 ,4442 ,105 -6,8723E-02 ,9572 
  3 ,2709 ,092 -3,2635E-02 ,5744 
 3 1 ,1734 ,662 -,2952 ,6419 
  2 -,2709 ,092 -,5744 3,264E-02
CULTURE 1 2 -,4784 ,343 -1,2805 ,3237 
  3 -,2508 ,703 -,9835 ,4818 
 2 1 ,4784 ,343 -,3237 1,2805 
  3 ,2275 ,501 -,2471 ,7021 
 3 1 ,2508 ,703 -,4818 ,9835 
  2 -,2275 ,501 -,7021 ,2471 
INPUT 1 2 ,2504 ,698 -,4737 ,9746 
  3 -4,7214E-02 ,985 -,7087 ,6142 
 2 1 -,2504 ,698 -,9746 ,4737 
  3 -,2976 ,234 -,7261 ,1308 
 3 1 4,721E-02 ,985 -,6142 ,7087 
  2 ,2976 ,234 -,1308 ,7261 
OUTPUT 1 2 -,6131 ,116 -1,3365 ,1104 
  3 -,1640 ,831 -,8248 ,4968 
 2 1 ,6131 ,116 -,1104 1,3365 
  3 ,4490* ,037 2,100E-02 ,8771 
 3 1 ,1640 ,831 -,4968 ,8248 
  2 -,4490* ,037 -,8771 -2,0996E-
02 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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APPENDIX C: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DIMENSIONS  
 
 
  DRAFT 
SERGEA
NT 
OFFICE
R 
ECONOM
Y 
CULTUR
E 
INPU
T 
OUTPU
T 
DRAFT Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.190* -.085 .359* .158* -.018 .292* 
 Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .062 .000 .000 .691 .000 
 N 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 
SERGEANT Pearson Correlation -.190* 1.000 .260* -.010 -.011 .151* -.122* 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .000 .824 .801 .001 .007 
 N 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 
OFFICER Pearson Correlation -.085 .260* 1.000 .182* .357* .061 -.008 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .062 .000 . .000 .000 .176 .862 
 N 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 
ECONOMY Pearson Correlation .359* -.010 .182* 1.000 .158* .145* .303* 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .824 .000 . .000 .001 .000 
 N 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 
CULTURE Pearson Correlation .158* -.011 .357* .158* 1.000 -.036 .058 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .801 .000 .000 . .429 .200 
 N 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 
INPUT Pearson Correlation -.018 .151* .061 .145* -.036 1.000 .254* 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .691 .001 .176 .001 .429 . .000 
 N 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 
OUTPUT Pearson Correlation .292* -.122* -.008 .303* .058 .254* 1.000 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .007 .862 .000 .200 .000 . 
 N 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
